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In this paper, we study the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible
items with the extra feature that the items lie on a line. Our goal is to find
a fair allocation that is contiguous, meaning that the bundle of each agent
forms a contiguous block on the line. While allocations satisfying the classical
fairness notions of proportionality, envy-freeness, and equitability are not
guaranteed to exist even without the contiguity requirement, we show the
existence of contiguous allocations satisfying approximate versions of these
notions that do not degrade as the number of agents or items increases.
We also study the efficiency loss of contiguous allocations due to fairness
constraints.
1 Introduction
We consider the classic problem in economics of fair division: How can we divide a
set of resources among interested agents in such a way that the resulting division is
fair? This is an important issue that occurs in a variety of situations, including students
splitting the rent of an apartment, couples dividing their properties after a divorce,
and countries staking claims in disputed territory. The fair division literature often
distinguishes between two types of resources. Some resources, such as cake and land, are
said to be divisible since they can be split arbitrarily among agents. Other resources,
like houses and cars, are indivisible—each house or car must be allocated as a whole to
one agent.
To reason about fairness, we must define what it means for an allocation of resources
to be fair. Several notions of fairness have been proposed, three of the oldest and best-
known of which are proportionality, envy-freeness, and equitability. An allocation is said
to be proportional if the utility that each agent gets from the bundle she receives is at
least a 1/n fraction of her utility for the whole set of resources, where n is the number
of agents among whom we divide the resources. The allocation is called envy-free if
every agent thinks that her bundle is at least as good as the bundle of any other agent,
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on
Algorithmic Game Theory, September 2017.
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and equitable if all agents have the same utility for their own bundle. It turns out that
there is a significant distinction between the two types of resources with respect to these
notions. On the one hand, when resources are divisible, allocations that satisfy the three
notions simultaneously always exist [1]. On the other hand, a simple example with two
agents who both positively value a single item already shows that the existence of a fair
division cannot be guaranteed for any of the notions when we deal with indivisible items.
In this paper, we study the problem of allocating indivisible items with the added
feature that the items lie on a line. We are interested in finding a fair allocation that
moreover satisfies the requirement of contiguity, i.e., the bundle that each agent receives
forms a contiguous block on the line. Several practical applications fit into this model.
For instance, when we divide offices between research groups on the same floor, it is
desirable that each research group get a contiguous block of offices in order to facilitate
communication within the group. Likewise, when we allocate retail units on a street, the
retailers often prefer to have a contiguous block of units in order to operate a larger store.
The contiguity condition can also be interpreted in the temporal sense, as opposed to the
spatial sense described thus far. An example is a situation where various organizers wish
to use the same conference center for their conferences. Not surprisingly, the organizers
typically want to schedule a conference in a contiguous block of time rather than during
several separate periods.
Since allocations that satisfy any of the three fairness notions do not always exist in
general, the same is necessarily true when we restrict our attention to contiguous alloca-
tions. Nevertheless, we show that in light of the contiguity requirement, the existence of
allocations that satisfy approximate versions of the notions can still be guaranteed. More
precisely, for each notion we define an approximate version that depends on an additive
factor ǫ ≥ 0. An allocation is said to be ǫ-proportional if the utility of each agent is at
most ǫ away from her “proportional share”, ǫ-envy-free if each agent envies any other
agent by at most ǫ, and ǫ-equitable if the utilities of any two agents differ by at most ǫ.
Denoting the maximum utility of an agent for an item by umax, we establish the existence
of a contiguous umax-proportional allocation and a contiguous umax-equitable allocation
for any number of agents, a contiguous umax-envy-free allocation for two agents, and a
contiguous 2umax-envy-free allocation for any number of agents. Importantly, the ap-
proximation factors do not degrade as the number of agents or items grows. We also
prove that our approximation factor is the best possible for proportionality and equi-
tability with any number of agents as well as for envy-freeness with two agents. Finally,
for proportionality the factor can be improved to n−1
n
· umax if we know the number n
of agents, and we show that this is again tight.
Our results suggest that adding the contiguity requirement does not entail extra costs
in terms of the approximation guarantees. Indeed, the approximation factors for pro-
portionality and equitability with any number of agents and for envy-freeness with two
agents remain tight even if we allow arbitrary allocations. This can be seen as somewhat
surprising, since the space of contiguous allocations is significantly smaller than that
of arbitrary allocations. Indeed, when there are n agents and m items, the number of
arbitrary allocations is nm, while the number of contiguous allocations for a fixed order
of items on a line is at most
(
m+n−1
n−1
)
n!. The latter quantity is much less than the former
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Indivisible Contiguous (this work) Non-contiguous ([9])
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n
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1
n
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Divisible Contiguous ([2]) Non-contiguous ([9])
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√
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2
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√
n) O(
√
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Equitability n− 1 + 1
n
n 1 (n+1)
2
4n n
Envy-freeness
√
n
2
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2 + 1− o(1) n2 Ω(
√
n) n− 12
Table 1: Comparison of our results on the price of fairness to previous results in [2, 9].
The bounds with an asterisk hold for infinitely many values of n.
if m is large compared to n.
In addition, we investigate the efficiency loss of contiguous allocations due to fairness
constraints using the price of fairness concept initiated by Caragiannis et al. [9]. The
price of fairness quantifies the loss of social welfare that is necessary if we impose a
fairness constraint on the allocation. A low price of fairness means that we can get
fairness at virtually no extra cost on social welfare, while a high price of fairness implies
that even the most efficient “fair” allocation has social welfare far below that of the
most efficient allocation overall. Caragiannis et al. studied the price of fairness for
the three notions of fairness using utilitarian welfare for both divisible and indivisible
items. Later, Aumann and Dombb [2] focused on contiguous allocations of divisible items
and considered both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare. In this paper, we complete the
picture by providing tight or almost tight bounds on the price of fairness for contiguous
allocations of indivisible items, again for all three classical notions of fairness and with
respect to both utilitarian and egalitarian welfare. Our results are summarized in Table 1
along with a comparison to results from previous work.
1.1 Related work
The contiguity condition has been studied with respect to the three classical fairness no-
tions in the context of divisible items, often represented by a cake, with the motivation
that one wants to avoid giving an agent a “union of crumbs”. In particular, Dubins and
Spanier [14] exhibited a moving-knife algorithm that guarantees a contiguous propor-
tional allocation. Cechla´rova´ et al. [11] showed that for any ordering of the agents, a
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contiguous equitable allocation that assigns contiguous pieces to the agents in that order
exists. Stromquist [18, 19] proved that a contiguous envy-free allocation always exists,
but cannot be found by a finite algorithm. Su [20] used techniques involving Sperner’s
lemma to establish the existence of a contiguous envy-free allocation and moreover con-
sidered the related problem of rent partitioning. Several of the results in this paper are
discrete analogs of the results in the divisible setting. For example, the algorithm in
Theorem 1 is a discrete analog of the Dubins-Spanier protocol, while Theorem 3 mirrors
the analogous result in the divisible setting by Aumann and Dombb [2].
Recently, Bouveret et al. [7] studied the allocation of indivisible items on a line with
the contiguity condition and showed that determining whether a contiguous fair alloca-
tion exists is NP-hard when the fairness notion considered is either proportionality or
envy-freeness. They also considered a more general model of the relationship between
items where the items are vertices of an undirected graph. Aumann et al. [3] investi-
gated the problem of finding a contiguous allocation that maximizes welfare for both
divisible and indivisible items. They showed that while it is NP-hard to find the optimal
contiguous allocation, there exists an efficient algorithm that yields a constant factor
approximation. Bei et al. [5] and Cohler et al. [12] also considered the objective of
maximizing welfare, but under the additional fairness constraint of proportionality and
envy-freeness, respectively.
Additively approximating fairness notions using umax, the highest utility of an agent
for an item, has been studied before. Lipton et al. [16] showed that without the contigu-
ity requirement, a umax-envy-free allocation exists even for general monotone valuations.
Caragiannis et al. [10] used the term “envy-freeness up to one good” (EF1) to refer to
a closely related property of an allocation.
Besides the allocation of goods, the price of fairness has also been investigated for
the allocation of chores. In particular, Caragiannis et al. [9], who initiated this line of
research, studied the notion for both divisible and indivisible chores. Heydrich and van
Stee [15] likewise considered the setting of divisible chores but, similarly to our work
and that of Aumann and Dombb [2], focused on contiguous allocations. Finally, Bilo` et
al. [6] applied this concept to machine scheduling problems.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of agents, and M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} the set of items
to be allocated. We assume that the items lie on a line in this order.
Each agent i ∈ N has some nonnegative utility ui(j) for item j ∈ M . For an agent
i, define ui,max := maxj∈M ui(j) to be the highest utility of i for an item. Let umax :=
maxi∈N ui,max be the highest utility of any agent for an item. As is very common (e.g.,
[8, 10, 13, 17]), we assume for most of the paper that utilities are additive. Additivity
means that ui(M
′) =
∑
j∈M ′ ui(j) for any agent i and any subset of items M
′ ⊆ M .
An allocation M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) is a partition of all items into bundles for the agents
so that agent i receives bundle Mi. The utilitarian welfare of M is
∑
i∈N ui(Mi) and
the egalitarian welfare of M is mini∈N ui(Mi). We call the allocation contiguous if each
4
bundle Mi forms a contiguous block of items on the line. Furthermore, we refer to a
setting with agents, items, and utility functions as an instance.
We are now ready to define the fairness notions that we will consider in this paper.
We use additive versions of approximation; this is much stronger than multiplicative
versions as the number of items grows.
Definition 1. An allocation M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) is said to be proportional if ui(Mi) ≥
1
n
· ui(M) for all i ∈ N . For ǫ ≥ 0, the allocation is said to be ǫ-proportional if
ui(Mi) ≥ 1n · ui(M) − ǫ for all i ∈ N . We refer to 1n · ui(M) as the proportional share
of agent i.
Definition 2. An allocation M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) is said to be envy-free if ui(Mi) ≥
ui(Mj) for all i, j ∈ N . For ǫ ≥ 0, the allocation is said to be ǫ-envy-free if ui(Mi) ≥
ui(Mj)− ǫ for all i, j ∈ N .
Definition 3. An allocation M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) is said to be equitable if ui(Mi) =
uj(Mj) for all i, j ∈ N . For ǫ ≥ 0, the allocation is said to be ǫ-equitable if |ui(Mi) −
uj(Mj)| ≤ ǫ for all i, j ∈ N .
There is a strong relation between proportionality and envy-freeness, as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 1. Any ǫ-envy-free allocation is ǫ-proportional.
Proof. Consider an ǫ-envy-free allocation M, and fix an agent i. We have ui(Mi) ≥
ui(Mj)− ǫ for all j ∈ N . Summing the n inequalities and dividing by n, we get
ui(Mi) ≥ 1
n
n∑
j=1
(ui(Mj)− ǫ) = 1
n
· ui(M)− ǫ.
Hence the allocation is ǫ-proportional.
In particular, when ǫ = 0, the proposition reduces to the well-known fact that any
envy-free allocation is proportional. When there are two agents, proportional allocations
are also envy-free (and in fact, more generally, ǫ-proportional allocations are 2ǫ-envy-
free.) This is, however, not necessarily the case if there are at least three agents. An
example is when an agent values her own bundle 1/n of the whole set of items and
values the bundle of another agent the remaining (n − 1)/n of the whole set of items.
On the other hand, equitability neither implies nor is implied by proportionality or
envy-freeness.
For each of the three (non-approximate) fairness notions defined above, the set of
instances for which a contiguous allocation satisfying the notion exists is strictly smaller
than the corresponding set when contiguity is not required. Indeed, suppose that there
are three items and two agents who share a common utility function u with u(1) =
u(3) = 1 and u(2) = 2. An allocation in which one agent gets items 1 and 3 while
the other agent gets item 2 is proportional, envy-free, and equitable. In contrast, no
contiguous allocation satisfies any of the three properties.
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We end this section by giving the definition of the various forms of the price of fairness.
Following Caragiannis et al. [9], we assume the normalization ui(M) = 1 for all i ∈ N
when we consider these price of fairness notions.
Definition 4. Given an instance (along with a set of allocations considered), its util-
itarian price of proportionality (resp., utilitarian price of equitability, utilitarian price
of envy-freeness) is defined as the ratio of the utilitarian welfare of the optimal allo-
cation over the utilitarian welfare of the best proportional (resp., equitable, envy-free)
allocation. If a proportional (resp., equitable, envy-free) allocation does not exist, the
utilitarian price of proportionality (resp., equitability, envy-freeness) is not defined for
that instance. The (overall) utilitarian price of proportionality (resp., utilitarian price of
equitability, utilitarian price of envy-freeness) is then the supremum utilitarian price of
proportionality (resp., utilitarian price of equitability, utilitarian price of envy-freeness)
over all instances.
The egalitarian price of proportionality, egalitarian price of equitability, and egali-
tarian price of envy-freeness are defined analogously.
3 Proportionality
We begin with proportionality. Our first result shows the existence of a contiguous
allocation in which every agent receives at least her proportional share minus n−1
n
times
her utility for her highest-valued item.
Theorem 1. Given any instance, there exists a contiguous allocation M such that
ui(Mi) ≥ 1
n
· ui(M)− n− 1
n
· ui,max
for all agents i ∈ N . In particular, there exists a contiguous n−1
n
· umax-proportional
allocation.
Proof. We process the items from left to right using the following algorithm.
1. Set the current block to the empty block.
2. If the current block yields utility at least 1
n
· ui(M) − n−1n · ui,max to some agent
i, give the block to the agent. (If several agents satisfy this condition, choose one
arbitrarily.)
• If all agents have received a block as a result of this, allocate the leftover
items arbitrarily and terminate.
• Otherwise, if some agent receives a block in this step, remove that agent from
consideration and return to Step 1.
3. Add the next item to the current block and return to Step 2.
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If an agent i receives a block of items from this algorithm, she obtains utility at least
1
n
· ui(M) − n−1n · ui,max. Hence it suffices to show that the algorithm allocates a block
to every agent. To this end, we show by (backward) induction that when there are k
agents who have not been allocated a block, each agent i among them has utility at least
k
n
· ui(M)− n−kn · ui,max for the remaining items. This will imply that the last agent has
utility at least 1
n
· ui(M)− n−1n · ui,max left, which is enough to satisfy our condition.
The base case k = n trivially holds. For the inductive step, assume that the statement
holds when there are k + 1 agents left, and consider an agent i who is not the next one
to receive a block. When there are k+1 agents left, her utility for the remaining items is
at least k+1
n
·ui(M)− n−k−1n ·ui,max. Since she does not receive the next block, her utility
for the block excluding its last item is less than 1
n
· ui(M) − n−1n · ui,max. This means
that her utility for the block is less than 1
n
· ui(M) + 1n · ui,max. Hence her utility for
the remaining items is at least
(
k+1
n
· ui(M)− n−k−1n · ui,max
)− ( 1
n
· ui(M) + 1n · ui,max
)
,
which is equal to k
n
· ui(M)− n−kn · ui,max, as desired.
The algorithm in Theorem 1 is similar to the Dubins-Spanier algorithm for propor-
tional cake-cutting [14] and runs in time Θ(mn), which is the best possible since the
input also has size Θ(mn). It can also be implemented as a mechanism that does not
elicit the full utility functions from the agents, but instead asks them to indicate when
the value of the current block reaches their threshold. While the mechanism is not
truthful,1 a truthful agent always receives no less than her proportional share minus n−1
n
times her utility for the item she values most.
As the next example shows, the additive approximation factor n−1
n
· umax is the best
possible in the sense that the existence of a contiguous α · n−1
n
· umax-proportional allo-
cation is not guaranteed for any α < 1. In fact, this is the case even if we remove the
contiguity requirement.
Example 1. Suppose that there are m = n − 1 items any of which each agent has a
utility of 1. The proportional share of every agent is n−1
n
. On the other hand, in any (not
necessarily contiguous) allocation, some agent does not receive an item and therefore has
a utility of 0. For any fixed α < 1, the utility of this agent is less than her proportional
share minus α · n−1
n
· umax.
Even though a contiguous umax-proportional allocation always exists, in some cases we
might also want to choose the ordering on the line in which the agents are allocated blocks
of items, in addition to imposing the contiguity requirement. For instance, the owner
of a conference center could have a preferred lineup of the conferences, and a building
manager might want to assign offices in certain parts of the floor to certain research
groups. Nevertheless, the following example shows that for approximate proportionality,
the ordering cannot always be chosen arbitrarily.
Example 2. Suppose that there are two agents and m ≥ 6 items. The first agent has
utility 1 for the last three items and 0 otherwise, while the second agent has utility 1
1Indeed, an agent can profit by not claiming a block when her threshold is reached if she believes that
no other agent is close to their own threshold yet.
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for every item. The proportional share of the two agents less half of the utility for their
highest-valued item is 1 and m−12 , respectively. If we want to give a left block to the first
agent and the remaining right block to the second agent, the left block needs to include
up to item m− 2. But this means that the second agent gets utility at most 2, which is
less than the required m−12 .
By increasing m and the number of items for which the first agent has utility 1, we
can extend the example to show that the existence of a contiguous allocation with a
fixed ordering of agents is not guaranteed even if we weaken the approximation factor
umax to kumax for any k > 1.
4 Equitability
We next consider equitability. As with proportionality, we show that a contiguous al-
location in which the values of different agents for their own block differ by no more
than umax always exists. Unlike for proportionality, however, for equitability we can
additionally choose the order in which the agents receive blocks on the line.
Theorem 2. Given any instance and any ordering of the agents, there exists a contigu-
ous umax-equitable allocation in which the agents are allocated blocks of items on the line
according to the ordering.
Note that in order to ensure that all agents are treated equally, one should normalize
the utilities across agents before applying Theorem 2, for example by rescaling the
utilities so that ui(M) = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the required ordering of agents is 1, 2, . . . , n
from left to right. Start with an arbitrary allocation satisfying the ordering. For any
allocation M, let max(M) = maxni=1 ui(Mi) and min(M) = minni=1 ui(Mi). In each
iteration, as long as the allocation does not satisfy the approximate equitability, we will
move an item at the end of a block to the block that the item is adjacent to. Here is the
description of the algorithm.2
1. Choose a block Mi such that ui(Mi) = max(M). If there are many such blocks,
choose one arbitrarily.
2. If max(M) ≤ min(M) + umax, stop and return the current allocation.
3. Choose a block Mj such that uj(Mj) = min(M). If there are many such blocks,
choose arbitrarily from the ones that minimize |j − i|.
4. Let Mk be the block between Mi and Mj that is next to Mj , i.e., k = j − 1 if
j > i and k = j + 1 if j < i. (It is possible that k = i.) The block Mk must be
non-empty; otherwise we would have chosen Mk instead of Mj . Move the item in
Mk that is adjacent to Mj to Mj .
2The algorithm is inspired by work on block partitions of sequences [4].
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a) If k = i and the moved item has nonzero utility for agent i, go to Step 1.
b) Else, go to Step 2.
If the algorithm terminates, then as the ordering of the agents for the blocks never
changed, the algorithm returns a umax-equitable allocation with the desired ordering.
Hence it remains to show that the algorithm terminates.
To this end, observe that when an item is moved in Step 4 of the algorithm, no new
block with utility max(M) or more to the block owner is created. Indeed, the block that
gets an additional item now yields utility at most min(M) + umax to its owner, which
is less than max(M) since the condition in Step 2 is not yet satisfied. Moreover, since
items are only being moved farther away from the main block Mi, we must eventually
reach a point where k = i; formally, the quantity
∑n
z=1 |i − z||Mz| strictly increases,
where |Mz | denotes the number of items in Mz. Since the quantity is bounded from
above, after a finite number of moves we will have k = i and meet the condition of Step
4(a).
The argument in the previous paragraph shows that the number of blocks with utility
max(M) decreases during the course of the algorithm. When this number reaches zero,
the value max(M) decreases. Since there are only a finite number of allocations, the
algorithm must terminate, as claimed.
The algorithm in Theorem 2 runs in time O(n2m4). For each iteration, computing
the maximum and minimum blocks takes O(m). There are O(m2) possible blocks. Each
block cannot be used as the block Mi in Step 1 more than once for each of the n agents,
since no new blocks with utility max(M) is created during an execution of the algorithm.
Finally, once the block Mi is fixed, the quantity
∑n
z=1 |i − z||Mz | can increase at most
O(mn) times, yielding the claimed running time.
Example 1 shows that for any number of agents, the approximation factor umax for
equitability cannot be improved even if we remove the contiguity requirement (and
hence also the ordering). On the other hand, using the same algorithm, we can gen-
eralize Theorem 2 to any monotonic, not necessarily additive utility function with
zero utility for the empty set. In particular, a umax-equitable allocation can be found
when agents are endowed with such utility functions, where the generalized definition
of umax is the highest marginal utility of any agent for a single item, i.e., umax =
maxi∈N,j∈M,S⊆M(ui(S ∪ {j}) − ui(S)).
Although the algorithm in Theorem 2 guarantees that an approximate equitable allo-
cation exists, such an allocation can be “equally bad” rather than “equally good” for the
agents. Indeed, if we start with an allocation that yields zero utility to every agent, then
the algorithm will terminate immediately despite the possible existence of an equitable
allocation with positive utility for all agents. If we insist on choosing the ordering of the
agents, then the next example shows that a situation that leaves some agent unhappy
may be unavoidable.
Example 3. Suppose that there are two items and two agents with u1(2) = u2(1) = 1
and u1(1) = u2(2) = 0. The allocation that gives item 1 to agent 2 and item 2 to agent
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1 yields a utility of 1 to both agents. If we require that agent 1 receive a left block and
agent 2 a right block, however, some agent is necessarily left with no utility.
Nevertheless, we show next that if we allow the freedom of choosing the ordering of the
agents, then an allocation with a better efficiency guarantee for the agents can always
be found. In particular, we can find an allocation whose egalitarian welfare equals the
highest egalitarian welfare over all contiguous allocations of the instance. The proof
mirrors that of the analogous result for divisible items by Aumann and Dombb [2].
Theorem 3. Given any instance, there exists a contiguous umax-equitable allocation
whose egalitarian welfare equals the highest egalitarian welfare over all contiguous allo-
cations of the instance.
Proof. Denote by w the highest egalitarian welfare over all contiguous allocations of the
instance, and let M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) be an allocation achieving this welfare, where we
assume without loss of generality thatM1, . . . ,Mn lie in this order on the line. We claim
that there exists a contiguous allocation in which each agent receives utility in the range
[w,w + umax]. To prove this claim, we proceed by induction on the number of agents.
The base case n = 1 is trivial.
Suppose that the claim holds for n − 1 agents. Starting from the allocation M, we
will move the boundaries between consecutive blocks to the left, beginning with the
boundary between the first two blocks and continuing rightwards. In particular, for
1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, we move the boundary between blocks i and i + 1 to the left until
w ≤ ui(Mi) < w + umax. Note that this is always possible since each item is worth no
more than umax to any agent. After moving all n− 1 boundaries, we reach an allocation
where w ≤ ui(Mi) < w+umax for 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 and un(Mn) ≥ w. If un(Mn) ≤ w+umax,
our claim is proved. Hence we can assume that un(Mn) > w + umax.
Next, we move the boundary between blocks n − 1 and n to the right until w <
un(Mn) ≤ w + umax; this is possible for similar reasons as above. Temporarily remove
agent n and her block. The current allocation of the remaining items to the n−1 agents
still yields utility at least w to each agent. On the other hand, there is no contiguous
allocation of these items to the n−1 agents with egalitarian welfare more than w. Indeed,
such an allocation would imply the existence of a contiguous allocation of all items to
the n agents with egalitarian welfare strictly more than w. This means that the current
distribution of the remaining items to the n−1 agents maximizes the egalitarian welfare,
and that welfare is w. By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a contiguous allocation
of the remaining items to the n−1 agents so that the utility of each agent is in the range
[w,w + umax].
3 Combined with w < un(Mn) ≤ w + umax, we have our claim.
As is the case for Theorem 2, the result can be generalized to monotonic, not nec-
essarily additive utility functions with zero utility for the empty set, where umax is
again defined as the highest marginal utility of any agent for a single item. A similar
3In fact, the inductive hypothesis implies the existence of such an allocation in which the utility of each
agent is in [w,w+u−n,max], where u−n,max ≤ umax denotes the highest utility of any of the first n−1
agents for an item.
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argument also shows that for any ordering of the agents, there exists a contiguous umax-
equitable allocation whose egalitarian welfare equals the highest egalitarian welfare over
all contiguous allocations with that ordering of the agents for the instance. However, the
proof of Theorem 3 does not give rise to an efficient algorithm for computing a desired
allocation.
5 Envy-freeness
We now turn to envy-freeness. If we remove the contiguity requirement, it is well-known
that a simple algorithm yields a umax-envy-free allocation for any number of agents
and items: Let the agents pick their favorite item in a round-robin manner from the
remaining items until all items are allocated. We show in this section that a umax-envy-
free allocation exists when there are two agents, and a 2umax-envy-free allocation exists
for an arbitrary number of agents.
For two agents, Theorem 1 directly implies the following.
Theorem 4. Given any instance with two agents, there exists a contiguous allocation
such that agent i has envy at most ui,max toward the other agent. In particular, there
exists a contiguous umax-envy-free allocation.
Tightness of the approximation factor umax follows from Example 1 with n = 2.
Moreover, an example similar to Example 2 shows that the result does not hold if we fix
the ordering of the agents, even when we replace umax by kumax for some k > 1.
To tackle the general setting with an arbitrary number of agents, we model the items
as divisible items. Since a contiguous envy-free allocation always exists for divisible items
[18], we can round such an allocation to obtain an approximate envy-free allocation for
indivisible items.
Theorem 5. Given any instance, there exists a contiguous allocation such that agent i
has envy less than 2ui,max toward any other agent. In particular, there exists a contiguous
2umax-envy-free allocation.
Proof. Consider a cake represented by the interval [0,m]. For j ∈M , agent i has uniform
utility ui(j) for the interval [j − 1, j]. Take any contiguous envy-free allocation of the
cake. We round the allocation as follows: For each item j, if point j is in the interior
of a piece, allocate the item to the agent who owns that piece. Else, point j is at the
boundary between two pieces, and we allocate item j to the agent who owns the piece
to the left.
The resulting allocation is contiguous; we show that each agent i has envy less than
2ui,max. The agent has no envy before the rounding. As a result of the rounding, she
loses utility less than ui,max, and any other agent gains utility less than ui,max from her
point of view. Hence agent i has envy less than 2ui,max, as claimed.
The guarantee in Theorem 5 can be strengthened if agents have binary utilities, i.e.,
the utility of each agent i for any item is either xi or 0, for some xi > 0. In other words,
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each agent either approves or disapproves each item. Such utilities have been considered
in the literature [8].
Corollary 1. Given any instance with agents having binary utilities, there exists a
contiguous allocation such that agent i has envy at most ui,max toward any other agent.
Proof. We do not need to consider any agent who does not approve any item, so we may
assume that ui,max = xi > 0 for each agent i. Theorem 5 guarantees the existence of an
allocation such that agent i has envy less than 2xi toward any other agent. However,
since the utility of agent i for any set of items is an integer multiple of xi, the agent’s
envy can be at most xi.
6 Price of Fairness
In this section, we quantify the price of fairness for contiguous allocations of indivisible
items with respect to the three notions of fairness and the two types of welfare. We
derive tight or almost tight bounds for each of the six resulting combinations. Previous
work has studied the problem for the setting of arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily contigu-
ous) allocations of divisible and indivisible items [9] as well as contiguous allocations of
divisible items [2]; our results therefore close the remaining gap. The comparison of our
results to previous work is shown in Table 1. In fact, for several of the results we will
be able to adjust arguments from the previous work mentioned to our setting.
Theorem 6. The utilitarian price of proportionality for contiguous allocations of indi-
visible items is n− 1 + 1
n
.
Proof. Upper bound : Consider an arbitrary instance. If a contiguous allocation with
maximum utilitarian welfare of the instance is also proportional, the price of propor-
tionality is 1. Else, some agent has utility less than 1
n
, and so the utilitarian welfare of
this allocation is less than n− 1+ 1
n
. On the other hand, in any proportional allocation,
every agent has utility at least 1
n
and therefore the utilitarian welfare is at least 1.
Lower bound : Let m = 2n− 1, 0 < ǫ < 1
n
, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , n− 1: ui(2i− 1) = ǫ, ui(2i) = 1n − ǫ, ui(2i+1) = n−1n , and ui(j) = 0
otherwise.
• un(2j − 1) = 1n − ǫ for j = 1, . . . , n− 1, un(2n − 1) = 1n + (n − 1)ǫ, and un(j) = 0
otherwise.
Consider the contiguous allocation that assigns the first item to agent n and items 2i
and 2i + 1 to agent i for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. The utilitarian welfare of this allocation is(
1
n
− ǫ)+ (n− 1)(1 − ǫ) = n− 1 + 1
n
− nǫ.
On the other hand, consider any proportional allocation. Each agent must get at
least one odd-numbered item in order for her utility to be at least 1
n
. Since there are
n odd-numbered items, every agent must get exactly one such item. It is clear that
agent n must get item 2n− 1. Given that, agent n− 1 must get both items 2n− 3 and
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2n − 2. Applying this argument repeatedly, we find that agent i must get items 2i − 1
and 2i. The utilitarian welfare of the resulting allocation, which is indeed proportional,
is 1 + (n− 1)ǫ. Taking ǫ→ 0, we have our claim.
Theorem 7. The utilitarian price of equitability for contiguous allocations of indivisible
items is 32 for n = 2 and infinite for n > 2.
Proof. n = 2: Consider an arbitrary instance. In an equitable contiguous allocation of
the instance with maximum utilitarian welfare, both agents must have utility at least 12 ;
otherwise they can switch their bundles. Let x ≥ 12 denote their utility in this allocation,
and assume without loss of generality that the first agent gets a left block and the second
agent the remaining right block. Consider any contiguous allocation. If the first agent
gets a left block, then at least one of the agents gets utility at most x. Similarly, if
the first agent gets a right block, then at least one of the agents gets utility at most
1− x ≤ x. Hence the utilitarian welfare of any contiguous allocation of this instance is
at most x+1. The ratio of the maximum utilitarian welfare of any contiguous allocation
to that of an equitable contiguous allocation is at most x+12x ≤ 32 .
To show that the bound 32 is tight, consider the following instance with m = 4. Let
u1(1) = u1(3) = u2(2) = u2(4) =
1
2 and ui(j) = 0 otherwise. One can check that the
maximum utilitarian welfare of a contiguous allocation is 32 , whereas that of an equitable
contiguous allocation is 1.
n > 2: Let m = n, ǫ < 12 , and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , n− 1: ui(i) = ǫ, ui(i+ 1) = 1− ǫ, and ui(j) = 0 otherwise.
• un(1) = 1− 2ǫ, un(n− 1) = un(n) = ǫ, and un(j) = 0 otherwise.
Consider the contiguous allocation that assigns the first item to agent n and item i+1
to agent i for i = 1, . . . , n− 1. The utilitarian welfare of this allocation is (1− 2ǫ)+ (n−
1)(1 − ǫ) = n − (n + 1)ǫ. On the other hand, the maximum utilitarian welfare of any
equitable allocation is nǫ. Taking ǫ→ 0, we have our claim.
Theorem 8. The utilitarian price of envy-freeness for contiguous allocations of indivis-
ible items is in the interval
( ⌊√n⌋
2 ,
√
n
2 + 1− o(1)
)
.
Proof. Upper bound : Given an arbitrary instance, consider a cake represented by the
interval [0,m]. For j ∈ M , agent i has uniform utility ui(j) for the interval [j − 1, j].
Aumann and Dombb [2, Theorem 2.1] showed that in this setting, the ratio of the utili-
tarian welfare of any contiguous allocation to that of any envy-free contiguous allocation
is at most
√
n
2 + 1 − n4n2−4n+2√n =
√
n
2 + 1 − o(1). Since contiguous allocations of indi-
visible items can be viewed as contiguous allocations of the cake, the result holds in our
setting as well.
Lower bound : Let n = m, r = ⌊√n⌋, and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , r − 1: ui(ir − j) = 1r for j = 0, . . . , r − 1, and ui(j) = 0 otherwise.
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• ur(j) = 1n−r(r−1) for j = r(r − 1) + 1, . . . , n.
• For i = r + 1, . . . , n: ui(j) = 1n for all j.
Consider the contiguous allocation that assigns items ir − r + 1, . . . , ir to agent i for
i = 1, . . . , r − 1 and the remaining items to agent r. The utilitarian welfare of this
allocation is r. On the other hand, an envy-free allocation exists, and in any such
allocation, every agent gets exactly one item. Hence the utilitarian welfare is at most
2− r
n
, and the utilitarian price of envy-freeness is therefore at least r2− r
n
> r2 =
⌊√n⌋
2 .
Theorem 9. The egalitarian price of proportionality for contiguous allocations of indi-
visible items is 1.
Proof. For an arbitrary instance, every agent has utility at least 1
n
in a proportional
contiguous allocation. This implies that in a proportional contiguous allocation with
maximum egalitarian welfare of the instance, every agent also has utility at least 1
n
.
Hence the latter allocation is also proportional, and the claim is proved.
Theorem 10. The egalitarian price of equitability for contiguous allocations of indivis-
ible items is 1 for n = 2 and infinite for n > 2.
Proof. n = 2: Consider an arbitrary instance. In an equitable contiguous allocation of
the instance with maximum egalitarian welfare, both agents must have utility at least 12 ;
otherwise they can switch their bundles. Let x ≥ 12 denote their utility in this allocation,
and assume without loss of generality that the first agent gets a left block and the second
agent the remaining right block. Consider any equitable allocation. If the first agent
gets a left block, then at least one of the agents gets utility at most x. Similarly, if
the first agent gets a right block, then at least one of the agents gets utility at most
1− x ≤ x. Hence the egalitarian welfare of any contiguous allocation of this instance is
at most x as well.
n > 2: We use the same example as in Theorem 7. There exists a contiguous allocation
with egalitarian welfare 1− 2ǫ, while the maximum egalitarian welfare of any equitable
allocation is ǫ. Taking ǫ→ 0, we have our claim.
Theorem 11. The egalitarian price of envy-freeness for contiguous allocations of indi-
visible items is n2 .
Proof. Upper bound : Consider an arbitrary instance. If the maximum egalitarian welfare
of a contiguous allocation of the instance is at least 12 , then the allocation is also envy-
free, and the price of envy-freeness is 1. Else, the maximum egalitarian welfare of a
contiguous allocation is less than 12 . On the other hand, in any envy-free allocation,
each agent has a utility of at least 1
n
, and therefore the egalitarian welfare is at least 1
n
.
Lower bound : Let m = 2n, 0 < ǫ < 12n , and assume that the utilities are as follows:
• For i = 1, . . . , n−1: ui(2i) = 12+ǫ, ui(2n−2i−1) = 12−ǫ, and ui(j) = 0 otherwise.
• un(j) = 12n for all j.
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Consider the contiguous allocation that assigns item 2i to agent i for i = 1, . . . , ⌊n−12 ⌋,
item 2n − 2i − 1 to agent i for i = ⌊n−12 ⌋ + 1, . . . , n − 1, and items n, n + 1, . . . , 2n to
agent n. The egalitarian welfare of this allocation is 12 − ǫ.
On the other hand, there exists an envy-free allocation, namely the allocation that
assigns items 2i − 1 and 2i to agent i for all i ∈ N . Consider any envy-free allocation.
If agent n gets at least three items in this allocation, her bundle will include an item for
which some other agent has utility 12 + ǫ, and the allocation cannot be envy-free. Hence
agent n has utility at most 1
n
, and the egalitarian welfare is also at most 1
n
. Taking
ǫ→ 0, we have our claim.
Note that even though envy-free allocations are always proportional, the utilitarian
price of envy-freeness is lower than the utilitarian price of proportionality. This is not a
contradiction since we only consider instances for which a contiguous allocation satisfying
the fairness notion in question exists when computing the price of fairness. Indeed, in
the instance used to show the lower bound in Theorem 6, no envy-free allocation exists.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items on a line in such
a way that each agent receives a contiguous block of items. This can be used to model
a variety of practical situations, including allocating offices to research groups, retail
units to retailers, and time slots for using a conference center to conference organizers.
We show that we can find contiguous allocations that satisfy approximate versions of
classical fairness notions. Notably, these approximation guarantees do not degrade as
the number of agents or items grows. We also quantify the loss of efficiency that occurs
when we impose fairness constraints on contiguous allocations.
We conclude the paper by presenting some directions for future work.
• For envy-freeness with an arbitrary number of agents, can we close the approxi-
mation factor gap between umax and 2umax? Can we obtain similar guarantees if
we also require Pareto optimality?
• Can we show the asymptotic existence or non-existence of contiguous allocations
satisfying proportionality or envy-freeness if we assume that the utilities are drawn
from certain distributions? This has been shown for non-contiguous allocations
[13, 17, 21].
• Does there exist an efficient algorithm that computes an approximate equitable
allocation with a nontrivial welfare guarantee?
• How do the prices of fairness change if we define them with respect to approximate
fair allocations (which always exist) instead of non-approximate fair allocations
(which do not always exist)?
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